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The computer information systems that are applied in business marketing or in public agencies (e.g. for ﬁ scal or national health 
insurance purposes) are complex products developed by specialized software engineers and accompanied by lots of documentation, 
tutorials and user manuals. These systems act in a comparatively complex environment of hardware devices and network infrastructure, 
often coexisting with other systems. No software product is 100% errorless and user-proof, so education of end users is critical for 
the security of the whole system in terms of preventing an unauthorized access that could expose data to the risk of loss or theft. The 
article presents threats connected with the use of complex computer information systems as well the related EU legal framework 
concerning cyber security. The purpose of the article is to highlight the current EU legal standard for cyber security and to indicate 
the urgent need for specialized education of the digital society members in this area.
Introduction
The more the computer-assisted systems support the members of digital society in a variety of business areas and their private 
life, the more knowledge is required for the users in order to properly and responsibly take advantage of these systems. Developing 
a safe, complex computer information system (hereinafter: CIS) is a tough task. Considering security issues in relation with a CIS 
would refer, but not be limited, to the following risks: data pollution (a system allows entering of invalid data and thus makes the 
existing data useless)1; data loss (a system allows cancelation of data while not providing a data back up to restore them); data leak 
(unauthorized access to the system exposes sensitive, secret data, e.g. personal data, to a leak)2, data theft (creating an additional, 
unauthorized copy of high-valuedata)3; system lock (unauthorized, harmful software running on a hardware, being part of the system 
disallows access to the system)4; system damage (a physical damage to the infrastructure caused by intruder’s activity)5; disaster 
causing a great damage (cyber attack directed e.g. on SCADA systems that are used to control automation processes in various areas 
of infrastructure, such as gas pipelines or nuclear energy plants)67
In order to prevent these threats effective users’ education is needed. In most cases the cyber security incidents are made possible 
because of ignorance or recklessness of system users, who consciously violate security procedures for a trivial shortcut in daily work.
The everyday life gives several examples of ofﬁ cials failing to comply with basic security rules regarding information systems, e.g.: 
1 S. Curtis, Mirror, Bupa suffers massive data breach exposing personal details of over 100,000 health insurance customers, 13 July 2017, 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/bupa-suffers-massive-data-breach-10793166, accessed 19 July 2017.
2 E. Perez, E. Sciutto, L. Jarrett, CNN, Contractor charged with leaking classiﬁ ed  NSA info on Russian hacking, 6 June 2017, http://edition.
cnn.com/2017/06/05/politics/federal-contractor-leak-prosecution/index.html, accessed 19 July 2017.
3  D. Talbot, Cyber-Espionage Nightmare, MIT Technology Review, 10 June 2015, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/538201/cyber-
espionage-nightmare/, accessed 19 July 2017.
4 Aljazeera, Global hacking attack infects 57,000 computers, 13 May 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/global-hack-attack-
infects-57000-computers-170513005030798.html, accessed 19 July 2017.
5  K. Zetter, Wired, A cyber attack has caused conﬁ rmed physical damage for the second time ever, 8 January 2015, https://www.wired.
com/2015/01/german-steel-mill-hack-destruction/, accessed 19 July 2017. 
6 J. Swearingen, New York Magazine, New ‘Industroyer’ Virus Is Designed to Take Down Power Grids, 13 June 2017, http://nymag.com/
selectall/2017/06/industroyer-crash-override-virus-power-grid-attack.html, accessed 19 July 2017.
7  K. Poulsen, Daily Beast, U.S. Power Companies Warned ‘Nightmare’ Cyber Weapon Already Causing Blackouts, 12 June 2017,  http://
www.thedailybeast.com/newly-discovered-nightmare-cyber-weapon-is-already-causing-blackouts, accessed 19 July 2017.
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the CIA director and his hacked email account8; the CEO of one of the Swedish biggest security companies who went bankrupt after 
he lost his identity through a computer hack9; emails leaked off the US Democratic National Committee because of e-mail server 
being hacked, which triggered a catastrophic loss for Clinton’s campaign10. However, damages caused by cyber attacks may have 
signiﬁ cant consequences also for averagecitizens. Moreover, those affected have little or even no inﬂ uence on how well their data 
is protected. The purpose of the article is therefore to present the current European Union (hereafter: EU) legal standards for cyber 
security and to indicate the urgent need for specialized education of the digital society members on this subject matter.
Educational assignments of the European Network and Information Security Agency
On 10 March 2004, the European Parliament and the Council issued a Regulation 460/2004 establishing the European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA)11. The Regulation states that in order to ensure conﬁ dence in networks and information 
systems it is necessary to inform, educate and train individuals, businesses and public administrations sufﬁ ciently in the ﬁ eld of 
network and information security. It also provides for that public authorities shall play a role in increasing awareness by serving 
information to the general public, small and medium-sized enterprises, corporate companies, public administrations, schools and 
universities. It assigns the obligation to the Agency to provide advice on best practices in awareness raising, training and courses12.
Furthermore, ENISA should contribute to the availability of timely, objective and comprehensive information on network and security 
issues for all users. For this purpose, ENISA is expected to promote exchange of up-to-date best practices, including methods of 
alerting users, and seeking synergy between public and private sector initiatives13. The Agency was initially established for the period 
of ﬁ ve years beginning from 14 March 200414. The continuity of ENISA’s mandate was later prolonged for the period of another 
three years through the Regulation 1007/200815, and, subsequently, for another 18 months through the Regulation 580/201116. Finally, 
the Regulation 526/201317 repealed Regulation 460/2004 and established again the ENISA for a period of 7 years agreeing that its 
headquarter shall be Heraklion(Crete, Greece)18.
After having established the ENISA, the EU pointed its crucial role in European cyber security in the Directive 2016/114819, 
the so-called Network and Information Systems Directive (hereafter: the NIS Directive). The NIS Directive refers to the 
ENISA stating that the Agency should assist the Member States and the Commission by providing expertise and advice and 
by facilitating the exchange of best practice20. It also indicates that ENISA should assist and serve guidanceas for adopting 
legal regulations on cyber security in the EU and provide exercises and trainings, helping to achieve appropriate level of 
readiness and awareness of interested parties21.The NIS Directive deﬁ nes incident as “any event having an actual adverse 
effect on the security of network and information systems”22, whereas the incident handling means “all procedures supporting 
the detection, analysis and containment of an incident and the response thereto”23. In the wording of the NIS Directive, risk 
is to be understood as “any reasonably identiﬁ able circumstance or event having a potential adverse effect on the security of 
network and information systems”24. The content of the deﬁ nitions indicate that physical, organizational, legal and ﬁ nancial 
infrastructure is needed to implement a system evaluating and mitigating risks, preventing and handling incidents in network 
infrastructure of information systems in order to ensure cyber security on a national level. In every aspect, it involves training 
and education of all user, in particular teams, organizations and cooperating entities, to achieve a predictable and measurable 
progress in a ﬁ ght against cybercrime.
The NIS Directive focuses i.a. on training professionals in securing crucial infrastructure of “operators of essential services”25. 
Such an operator would be an entity providing service that is essential for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic 
activities, whereas the provision of that service depends on network and information systems and an incident would have signiﬁ cant 
disruptive effects on the provision of that service. Sectors and subsectors, in which operators of essential services would operate are 
listed in Appendix II of the NIS Directive: electricity; oil; gas;air transport; rail transport; water transport; road transport; banking; 
ﬁ nancial market; health;drinking water supply and distribution; and digital infrastructure.The Member States should identify those 
entities by November 9, 201826 and include them in a national strategy on the security of network and information systems. The 
national strategy on the security of network and information systems shall address, in particular, “an indication of the education, 
awareness-raising and training programmes relating to the national strategy on the security of network and information systems”27. 
8 K. Zetter K, Wired, TeenWhoHacked CIA Director’s Email Tells How He Did It, 19 October, 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/10/hacker-
who-broke-into-cia-director-john-brennan-email-tells-how-he-did-it/, accessed 19 July 2017.
9  N. Rolander, Bloomberg, Swedish Security Company Boss Declared ‘Bankrupt’ After Identity Stolen https, 12 July 2017, https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-12/securitas-ceo-declared-bankrupt-after-his-identity-was-stolen, accessed 19 July 2017.
10  L. Harding, The Guardian, Top Democrat's emails hacked by Russia after aide made typo, investigation ﬁ nds, 14 December 2016, https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/14/dnc-hillary-clinton-emails-hacked-russia-aide-typo-investigation-ﬁ nds, accessed 19 July 2017.
11 Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 establishing the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (Text with EEA relevance), Ofﬁ cial Journal L 077, 13/03/2004 P. 0001 – 0011.
12  Recital 14, ibidem.
13 Article 3 (e), ibidem.
14 Article 27, ibidem.
15 Article 1, Regulation (EC) No 1007/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 460/2004 establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency as regards its duration (Text with EEA relevance), Ofﬁ cial 
Journal L 293, 31.10.2008.
16 Article 1, Regulation (EU) No 580/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 
460/2004 establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency as regards its duration (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 165, 
24.6.2011, p. 3–4.
17 Article 35, Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 concerning the European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 165, 
18.6.2013, p. 41–58.
18 Recital 4, ibidem.
19  Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of 
security of network and information systems across the Union, OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1–30.
20 Recital 36, ibidem.
21 Recital 38, ibidem.
22 Article 4 p. 7, ibidem.
23 Article 4. p. 8, ibidem.
24  Article 4 p. 9, ibidem.
25  As deﬁ ned in Article 4 p. 4 and Article 5 p. 2, ibidem.
26 In accordance to the Article 5 p. 1, ibidem.
27 As deﬁ ned in Article 7, ibidem.
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The EU Member States are obliged to implement the NIS Directive by May 10, 201828, that is i.a. those aspects regarding: education29; 
risk mitigation30; incidents recognition and handling31; data and information exchange32; strategy building33; operators of essential 
services identiﬁ cation34.
Security issues regarding CIS should be of interest of system technical designers and architects, end users, system administrators, 
legislators, as well as system manual creators. The proper legislation is likely to enforce adequate CIS tailoring through the regulation 
of preliminary design phases and the introduction of obligatory administrator tasks control lists. However, every system would be 
unprotected, if end users were not act responsibly and with the so-called “cyber hygiene”. For this purpose, ENISA introduced a short 
pamphlet for every CIS user, giving hints on how to stay protected in daily Internet life35.
Cyber security of Personal Data as a Module Standard
It should be noticed, that by 2017 there has been 13 years since ENISA was founded. Recital 16 of the Regulation 526/2013 
stresses, referring to its goals and objectives, that “In order to achieve this, the necessary budgetary funds should be allocated to the 
Agency”. Budget should be “sufﬁ cient and autonomous” and “comes primarily from a contribution from the EU and contributions 
from third countries participating in the Agency’s work”36.The budget of ENISA was set to: 10,06 Million Euro in 2015,11,03 Million 
Euro in 2016, and 11,24 Million Euro in 201737. Regarding the goals and objectives of ENISA and its special role as an expected 
shield providing advise and education, aiming at the protection of the EU’s private businesses and government agencies from cyber 
attack,which could have enormous implications38, the annual budget of ENISAis obviously insufﬁ cient. To make it more visible:
11 Million Euro would allow to buy about 500 minutes for commercials in one of the Polish TV networks during high publicity39; 
11 Million Euro will be paid to a runner-up of football Champions League ﬁ nals in 201740; 11 Million Euro would allow to break into 
10 iPhone locked phones in search for information possibly allowing to prevent a terrorist attack41; 8 annual budgets are needed to 
buy one combat plane Euroﬁ ghter Typhoon42.
Regarding the alleged costs of cyber defence, it should be therefore pointed out that every state needs to introduce and to execute 
high national legal standards in computer network information systems to ensure that use rare appropriately trained and educated.
This requirement is supported by the Regulation 2016/67943 on personal data protection, according to which a private company can be 
ﬁ ned up to 20 Million Euro or 4% of its annual world income for the violation of personal data protection rules44. However, in the 119 
pages long text of the Regulation 2016/679, a term “education” is mentioned only twice and it only once points to a need to introduce 
awareness-raising activities addressed to the public, including micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as natural persons 
in particular in the educational context45. The NIS Directive states that personal data are in many cases compromised as a result of 
incidents46 and indicates that the processing of personal data shall be carried out in accordance with EU law47. 
However, this is the educational aspect, not the penalization of infringements to the law that should be put in the limelight. The 
educational approach is more likely to make the data processing more secure, because it is based not on the effect, but on the cause of 
the infringement. This approach has been applied in the Polish Regulation on the appropriate organizational and technical conditions 
required for personal data processing in computer systems48. The Regulation describes in detail the composition of the security 
policy that is required to be introduced by any entity processing personal data with the use of IT systems: enumeration of buildings, 
where data is processed; description of data sets;data ﬂ ows; procedures of the assignment of credentials; start, pause and end of a 
working day; creation of backups and storage;handling of electronic data carriers; electronic system security; and systems reviews 
and maintenance49. The Regulation also introduces three levels of required security, depending on the category of the processed data 
as well as on whether the system is connected to a public information network. The levels of sensitivity, that is basic, intermediate 
and high, provide for detailed description of precautions needed to be undertaken in order to comply with the required security, such 
as:the limitation to access to rooms where personal data is stored; the necessity to change password every 30 days; the requirement to 
28 Article 25, ibidem.
29 Art. 7 p. 1(d); Art. 11 p. 3 (e), (f), (k); Art. 12 p. 3 (h); Art.12 p. 3 (j); Art.13 p. (6), p. (7), ibidem.
30 Art. 4 p. 9; Art 6; Art.7 p. 1(f); Art.11 p. 3 (i); Art.12 p. 3 (f); Art.14 p. (1), p. (2), ibidem.
31 Art.1 p. 2(c); Art. 4 p. (7), p. (8); Art. 12 p. 3 (c), (d), (e); Art. 14 p. (4), ibidem.
32 Art.1 p. 2(b);  Art. 8; Art.10; Art.11; Art.12, Art.14 p. (3), p. (5), Art. 16 ibidem.
33 Art. 1 p. 2(a); Art. 4, p. (3),  Art. 7, ibidem.
34 Art. 5; Art.6; Art.14; Art.15, ibidem.
35  ENISA, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/multimedia/posters/cybersecurity-education-posters-2016/enisa-eduposters-el.pdf/, accessed 
19 July 2017.
36 Recital 51, Regulation 526/2013, op. cit.
37  Statement of Estimates 2017 (Budget 2017), European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/
about-enisa/accounting-ﬁ nance/ﬁ les/annual-budgets/enisa-2017-annual-budget, accessed 19 July 2017.
38  See: M. Elsberg, Blackout – Morgenist es zuspät, Blanvalet Verlag 2012. The author presents an interesting vision of a total and universal 
disaster after a  cyber attack turning off the electricity in Europe and United States. 
39 P. Pallus, Business Insider Polska, Najdroższe reklamy są w Polsacie. Do 97 tys. zł za pół minuty, 22 August 2016, http://businessinsider.
com.pl/media/reklama/koszt-reklamy-telewizyjnej/2rjtmpd, accessed 19 July 2017.
40 2016/17 Champions Leaguer evenue distribution, 25 August 2016, http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/news/newsid=2398575.
html, accessed 19 July 2017.
41 J. Edwards, Reuters, FBI paid more than $1.3 million to break into San Bernardino iPhone, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-
encryption-fbi-idUSKCN0XI2IB, accessed 19 July 2017.
42  http://www.deagel.com/Combat-Aircraft/Typhoon_a000442001.aspx, accessed 19 July 2017.
43 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88.
44 Article 83 p. 5, ibidem.
45 Recital 132, Regulation 2016/679, op. cit.
46 Recital 63, Directive 2016/1148, op. cit.
47 Article 2, ibidem, indicating the Directive 95/46/EC, that has been repealed by the Regulation (EU) 2016/679, op. cit. Processing of personal data 
by Union institutions and bodies pursuant to this Directive shall be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001, Regulation (EC) 
No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1–22.
48 RozporządzenieMinistraSprawaWewnętrznychiAdministracji z dnia 29 kwietnia 2004 r. w sprawiedokumentacjiprzetwarzaniada
nychosobowychorazwarunkówtechnicznychiorganizacyjnych,jakimpowinnyodpowiadaćurządzeniaisystemyinformatycznesłużącedo 
przetwarzaniadanychosobowych, Dz. U. z 2004 r. Nr 100, poz. 1024.
49  Article 4, ibidem.
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encrypt solid memory units in portable devices; procedures for the utilisation of wasted devices on which the personal data is stored. 
This Regulation could serve as a model standard of how education on cyber security could be brought into legislation, presenting to 
readers in-depth precautions indispensable to comply with the law. Interestingly, this Regulation is consistent with the international 
norms ISO/IEC 2700050, altogether allowing for relatively easy and predictable processing of personal data in CIS  supported by a 
chain of education, training and certiﬁ cation.
The healthcare system is a representative area of sensitive data that demands great awareness and knowledge in the process of 
its securing. The Polish Regulation regarding requirements for the System of Medical Information51 establishes a central national 
database i.e. of medical occurrences and documents issued by healthcare entities. The Regulation includes a list of Polish norms, 
which the System of Medical Information shall be compatible with52. The norms provide for a model of electronic documentation and 
security procedures for data transmitted in the healthcare system. It refers to EU regulations regarding data security in international 
transmission of healthcare data53 and points out to the ISO/IEC 2700254 in the context of the management of information security 
in the healthcare system. References to international norms can be also found i.e. in the Polish Regulation on the system of threads 
monitoring55 and in the Polish Regulation regarding minimal requirements for some data communication systems functioning in the 
healthcare system56.
Conclusions
The legal approach to cyber security and cyber defence needs to be developed on a educational level in order to ensure that the 
assumptions of the EU regulations are possible to be achieved with the allocated means, that is: budget, infrastructure and authority’s 
support. Too much expectation for required results in cyber defence relying on ENISA could undermine the awareness for the need 
of education on cyberspace security. It is obvious that ENISA is not able to cover this subject efﬁ ciently, since the annual budget 
allocated for its activities is not sufﬁ cient in any case.
In order to protect the cyberspace, the legislator should include in adopted legal acts the information on not only “what” should be 
done and “what” is allowed or disallowed, but also on “how” to do it and “how” to avoid the risks. To improve the law quality and to 
comply with the intentions of the legislator it is therefore recommended to provide for more speciﬁ c information on how to achieve 
the desired result by giving reference to widely accepted norms, standards or literature published by or on behalf of legal authorities. 
It is also advisable to introduce educational programs intending to train not only entrepreneurs and entities, who are responsible for 
cyber security, but also “ordinary citizen” on what level of security they may expect from those responsible for their security and how 
they could safeguard themselves.
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In this article we consider the peculiar properties of regulation of minor’s workers security within the Law of the European Union. 
To reveal such peculiar properties of legal regulation of a work security of youth within the Instruction of EU 89/391/EEC, as well 
as Instructions of 94/33/ЕС. Proper analysis of regulation of rules and rules of guarantees of the workers` rights under the age of 
18 years which work on the basis of the labour contract or rules which are determined by the current legislation of the state-member 
and/or conformed to the current legislation of the state-member was fulﬁ lled. Thus, we may conﬁ rm, that except for some details, 
within EU territory the complex of the minimal labour standards for stable working environment which now are applied in all states-
participants is created.
Keywords: work security, youth work, European Union, EU legislation.
The important direction of Ukrainian integration is cooperation with the European Union which ﬁ nal strategic aim - fully entry of 
Ukraine into the European Union. A key element of successful integration is an achievement of the certain level of a coordination of 
the legislation of our country with European Union law.
One of directions of harmonization process is coordination of Ukrainian legislation which settles labour safety issue in conformity 
with rules of the European Union. It has to be noticed, that labour safety, especially an issue of work of youth safety is related to the 
area of the labour law.
Some radical political, economic changes in state and society, have pointed the problems connected with use of hired labour, 
creation of the effective mechanism of regulation of labour relations, providing of guarantees of human’s right to work. Their 
resolving, especially concerning work of youth, has the important social value, requires radical changing of traditional approaches 
50  ISO/IEC 27000 family - Information security management systems, https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.
html, accessed 19 July 2017.
51  Rozporządzenie Ministra Zdrowia z dnia 28 marca 2013 r. w sprawie wymagań dla Systemu Informacji Medycznej, Dz.U. 
2013 poz. 463.
52 Article 9, ibidem.
53 Article 12, p. 2, ibidem.
54  ISO/IEC 27002:2013, https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/ Information technology -- Security techniques -- Code of practice for 
information security controls, available at: https://www.iso.org/standard/54533.html, accessed 19 July 2017.
55 Article 4, Rozporządzenie Ministra Zdrowia z dnia 9 lipca 2013 r. w sprawie Systemu Monitorowania Zagrożeń, Dz.U. 
2013 poz. 853.
56 Article 9, Rozporządzenie Ministra Zdrowia z dnia 14 sierpnia 2013 r. w sprawie minimalnych wymagań dla niektórych 
systemów teleinformatycznych funkcjonujących w ramach systemu informacji w ochronie zdrowia, Dz.U. 2013 poz. 999.
